



Sperrfrist: Keine Freigabe!

Vortrag des
Generalinspektors der Bundeswehr
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**"Force Transformation – Facing the Security
Challenges of the 21 th Century"**

am Collège Interarmées de Défense

am 20. September 2004

in Paris

Es gilt das gesprochene Wort

< Mon Général, Monsieur le Directeur (CID) Général de brigade FLICHY, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur Neubert, Mesdames et Messieurs,>

ggf. eingehen / Anschluss suchen an Rede Gen Bentégeat

Je suis particulièrement reconnaissant d'avoir aujourd'hui l'honneur de parler devant cette assemblée. Lors d'une rencontre au début de cette année, le Général Bentégeat et moi avons pris la décision d'élargir le dialogue franco-allemand entre nos forces armées en venant ensemble ici au Collège Interarmées de Défense et en allant à la Führungsakademie de la Bundeswehr.

Notre objectif est de fournir des informations sur des thèmes d'actualité et d'intérêt commun dans les instituts formant nos futurs cadres et de discuter avec vous. C'est vous, les cadres de demain, qui apporterez bientôt votre contribution à la planification et à la réalisation du processus de transformation de nos forces armées. Il me semble donc important de vous familiariser avec nos réflexions et nos visions de l'avenir dans le cadre d'un dialogue commun.

La restructuration de nos forces armées constitue aujourd'hui au niveau national tout comme à l'échelle de l'OTAN et de l'Union européenne un défi que nous devons relever afin d'être à même de nous adapter aux paramètres en constante évolution prévalant dans le domaine de la politique de sécurité. Le processus de transformation qui en découle a lieu au moment où nos forces armées opèrent dans ce nouveau contexte de sécurité. Il s'agit encore ici d'un défi particulier.

Durant vos stages dans ce Collège, vous vous êtes déjà penchés sur les nouveaux défis du XXI^e siècle en matière de sécurité. Je mettrai donc l'accent lors de cet exposé sur les transformations à l'échelle de l'OTAN et de l'Union européenne ainsi qu'au niveau national en tenant également compte des contributions apportées dans le cadre de la coopération franco-allemande.

Vous comprendrez que je choisisse de continuer mon exposé en anglais.

Unforeseen and fundamental changes in our security environment have required an adaptation of the political, politico-military and conceptional framework in NATO, EU and on national basis.

Transformation has become a synonym for our common vision how armed forces can contribute to cope with the **security challenges of the 21th century**. Goal is to provide our political leadership with a flexible and reliable tool for international conflict prevention and crisis management within a comprehensive security policy.

This process of transformation will enable our armed forces to address the new challenges deriving from the new forms of conflicts and against new actors appearing in those conflicts. Furthermore it will have to cope with a steadily increasing speed of technological innovation.

With the political guidance from the summit in Prague NATO has given it's answer to these security challenges and has set the impetus for transforming the Alliance - thus making it fit for the future.

Basis for the adaptation of the Alliance to the security challenges of this century is the Strategic Concept of 1999. On this foundation NATO has embarked on a process of transformation, the development of the NATO Response Force is a prominent result of this ongoing process that is strongly supported by all partners.

At the same time NATO is engaged in the fight against international terrorism in Art 5 operations and to re-establish peace and stability on the Balkans. The reciprocal assignment of large national contingents to COM KFOR – change of command from Germany to France was executed on the 1th September – underlines the trustful relations between our countries.

Another consistent step is the conduct of the first out-of-area-nation-building-operation under NATO flag in Afghanistan. The staff of the EUROCORPS and the German-French Brigade are presently taking a most prominent responsibility in this operation.

The European Union (EU) has defined its role in the strategic environment within the last decade and built up a strategic partnership between NATO and EU. The Berlin Plus Agreement that emanated from the Prague Summit provides for mutual support between NATO and EU in their missions and operations.

Within the framework of ESDP on the political level and the European Headline Goal as well as the Task Force concept the EU is enhancing its military and civil capabilities for conflict prevention and crisis management.

In this way the EU will develop to an powerful player and is taking a complementary approach to this strategic partnership aiming at strengthening the European pillar in NATO, thus taking over her part in common burdensharing.

The European Union can already commit a response force today: First independent military operations have successfully been accomplished in Congo and Macedonia. The assumption of the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia will expand the European presence on the Balkans and will contribute to global security.

NATO's Prague Capabilities Commitment as well as the European Union's Headline Goal identified fields of action to improve interoperability and altogether enhance the military capabilities decisively. They concentrate on the most significant areas and require firm commitments.

Points of concern often mentioned in this context are the lack of lift and expeditionary logistic capabilities as well as communications and surveillance systems. Let me briefly elaborate on these areas.

Co-operation is a promising approach to concentrate our efforts on significant areas. Improving the **strategic airlift capability within NATO and EU** is a project, that is primarily German / French driven. A future European Air Command and the **coordinated multinational long term acquisition program for the Airbus A 400M transport aircraft** will support this approach significantly.

Present **lack of strategic airlift capability** will be spanned by an interim solution. Courses of action range from purchasing new aircraft to having resources available on a of charter/leasing basis.

In the field of Airborne Surveillance and Reconnaissance I want to mention two different projects. Firstly Germany is involved in the development of the **Alliance Ground Surveillance System** which will improve NATO's capabilities in this field significantly. Secondly Germany and France are developing a **satellite based reconnaissance system**¹ which is planned to become the core of the European reconnaissance satellite program.

The objective is to provide our armed forces with the ability to conduct **effective, integrated military operations within the framework of NATO and EU.**

¹ SAR-Lupe and HELIOS II

Therefore we have to make **best use** of our resources, reduce or avoid **unnecessary duplications** and thus **enhance the efficiency** of the defense efforts. This approach was emphatically confirmed on the occasion of the 40 year anniversary of the **Conseil Franco-Allemand de Défense et de Sécurité**.

There are **several integration strategies** being already practiced or in discussion to support this approach, e.g. a **multinational approach**, **pooling**, **specialization** and last but not least a greater degree on **defense integration** including **co-ordination of procurement**.

But to be **realistic**, here and now there is **still a way to go** to fully introduce these described integration strategies. This approach can only be successful, if all partners support and introduce them **without conditions**. The foundation for a **deeper defense integration** is the **unrestricted reliability**, **avallability** and **provision of the full spectrum of military capabilities**, **national caveats** have to stay back. Germany and France will continue to **press ahead** this approach.

But let me return to one **fundamental idea** of transformation. Transformation does not mean the **further enhancement of the existing**, but does mean a **new quality of military capabilities**.

To define the new required capabilities, we cannot use old yardsticks. I will give you an example:

NATO still calculates its requirement based on attrition rates of World War II, the Korean and Vietnam War. Is this yardstick of 30 to 50 years still realistic?

Panama, Grenada, the Golf War, Kosovo and the recent Iraq campaign are teaching different figures. Here is a real challenge for our new Joint Allied Lessons Learned Center: provide realistic scales based on real experiences.

Therefore, I'm very glad that multinational co-operation in the area of Concept Development and Experimentation has been intensified, be it in the framework of the Alliance or multi- or bilaterally.

Concept Development and Experimentation is a core element of transformation. It provides us with an instrument to validate new ideas, concepts and requirements or the applicability of technological innovations for military purposes.

Concept Development and Experimentation thus supports the development of new capabilities on basis of new yardsticks. At the same time it supports the allocation of scarce resources to the new necessary capabilities.

15 months ago NATO has inaugurated the new **NATO Response Force**, a joint and combined force which brings everything together to form a robust rapid reaction capability, deployable and sustainable wherever it may be required.

Within the framework of the European Headline Goal the EU members have agreed on the complementary **EU-Battlegroup Concept** which is about to take off in 2005. The **German-French Brigade** is planned to become the nucleus of one Battlegroup.

From the German perspective we consider the NATO Response Force and the EU-Battlegroup Concept as **core elements** for the armed forces transformation process and a milestone for the future of the Alliance and the European Security and Defense Policy as well.

Thus the NRF- and the Battlegroup-concept is an important **yardstick** for our national force structure which has been designed within the transformation process and which will be finalized by 2010.

We differentiate between three force categories. Firstly the **Response Forces**:

About 35.000 response forces will provide a war fighting capability and will be able to participate in joint and combined high intensity operations. Those operations will be of highest complexity and therefore will require most modern military equipment. This includes the ability to conduct joint network-based-operations to the highest extent possible.

Secondly the Stabilization Forces:

The bulk of the envisaged operations in which Germany will predictably be involved, will be peace support or nation building operations. Our national level of ambition is to cope with a maximum of up to five different operations of that kind. A maximum of 14.000 troops at a time will prepare the ground for peaceful solutions of conflicts and for nation-building activities. A total of 70.000 stabilization forces will be able to fulfil tasks in this broad spectrum of operations.

Finally the Support Forces:

147.500 support forces will ensure timely and comprehensive support of all ongoing operations in the complete spectrum. The support forces will, for example, ensure logistics and transport, run depots, provide military police forces and command and control capabilities.

The main task is to support ongoing operations of our response- and stabilization forces. Furthermore they are responsible for the basic services for the daily routine in the Bundeswehr.

The entire German force will - by 2010 - comprise a number of 250.000 men and women plus reserve forces.

The new force structure will increase the operational usability of our forces significantly. From a German perspective the forces will be tailored to what we expect them to do within the transatlantic, the European as well as the national context.

The reality of such operations teaches us every day that we need a continuum of tailored-to-mission forces for the entire spectrum of tasks. We believe that the German force categories will fully meet the requirements of the current as well as the foreseeable operations. Perhaps this categorization of forces might be a benchmark for other nations' forces as well.

That brings me to my last topic. Transformation requires a change in mind.

Obviously transformation is being misunderstood by the majority of people, believing transformation was only keeping the technological edge. Actually, it is much more. Transformation aims at how we are doing our business: joint, combined, multilaterally, multi-nationally and flexible.

In this respect I like to refer to Admiral Giambastiani who keeps saying that transformation requires better trained and educated leaders, who are sufficiently courageous to take own decisions based on all information offered by the new network centric information systems without waiting for orders.

Let me conclude with the thesis that this process of transformation can only be successful, if it is driven by an open-minded and courageous leadership. This is the present and future yardstick for all of us as military leaders.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thank you for your attention. I now look forward to a fruitful discussion.